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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DC/PhysD C/PhysD	4 MAR 1971	WJ
2	DD/PTAS	3/8/71	ac
3	D/SECURITY	8 MAR 1971	WJ
4	DD/SECURITY	3/10	WJ
5	C/EXECUTIVE STAFF	10 MAR 1971	WJ
6	Chm. /USIB/CSS	10 Mar 71	WJ
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
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cc: Chm. /IP Board			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
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
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1 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

**SUBJECT: USCSB Computer Security Ad Hoc Committee Meeting,
26 February 1971**

1. In accordance with my earlier discussion with its chairman and at his invitation, I attended the second meeting of the USCSB Computer Security Ad Hoc Committee held in Room C-2A-58, "S" Building, NSA, Ft. George G. Meade on 26 February 1971 between 1000 and 1430 hours. In attendance were:



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
In view of my observer status as a USIB representative and to support  position as the CIA member of the group, I deliberately did not participate in any of the discussions at the meeting.

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2. At the beginning of the meeting all participants were furnished copies of written comments received from various Agencies on the draft proposal developed at the earlier committee meeting and disseminated to CSB members on 4 February 1971. In addition the thrust of comments received orally was announced by the chairman.

3. Copies of written comments are attached. In addition, my interpretation of these responses is summarized as follows along with the reported oral reactions to the proposal:

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- * AEC : Concur as written
- FBI : Concur (as written)
- Navy : Concur (as written)
- * Army : Not received, but reportedly will concur as written
- ASD(A) : Concur only re COMSEC/EMSEC aspects of computer security problems
- NSA : Concur only re COMSEC/EMSEC applications and where the computer is an integral part of a secure Federal telecommunications system
- * State : Non-concur; recommends CSB and USIB work jointly
- * CIA : Non-concur, except re COMSEC/EMSEC aspects; also recommends CSB and IB work jointly
- Transportation: Open to interpretation; concurs, but also speaks of "those areas of computer security presently assigned to (the USCSB)"
- AF : Acknowledges need for a national policy on computer security, but mentions that CSB may not be the proper national forum for its development; AF position not yet finalized and may be expected before 15 March 1971
- Treasury : Called attention to the newly created Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) which already has a responsibility for the security aspects of teleprocessing

* Not received in writing

4. The summary of the written comments outlined above by me does not represent the interpretation and analysis made by the Ad Hoc Committee. In fact, the committee discussion of the comments reflected a lack of uniformity in reading their separate meanings. Unfortunately - I am editorializing - the chairman elected to accent their differences rather than any degree of commonality. He emphasized that they covered the full spectrum of possible reactions from concur "as is," through concur "but," to non-concur. As a result of this approach, seemed lost on what his next step should be. (The fact that almost all agreed that the CSB could devote efforts to the COMSEC/EMSEC areas

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of the problem was ignored; this could serve as a base on which to build any CSB action.)

5. The discussion of what the committee should do next in view of the spectrum of reaction to its earlier proposal reflected in itself a range of opinions:

a. [] seemed to fight the problem and challenged, for example, the submissions received under DD/NSA and ASD(A) signatures. Their comments suggested that they had authored the original proposal. Also, they emphasized the need for interpreting the scope of CSB COMSEC responsibilities as extending to any computer tied into a given crypto link; this is the basis of their argument.

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b. [] was more reasonable. He appeared to honor the ASD(A) and other comments and suggested that maybe the problem is not "national" in dimension, but just a common problem in many different environments.

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c. [] took a sensible and practical approach. He called attention to the organizational (jurisdictional) division of responsibilities in individual Agencies and suggested that CSB membership is composed of Communications-oriented people who do not have cognizance for the full range of aspects of computer security.

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6. Extended discussion suggested that the following actions be taken:

a. The chairman should report to the CSB at its scheduled 15 March meeting that the Ad Hoc Committee needs more time to complete its task; he would summarize the committee's activities to date including the draft proposal, the reaction thereto and committee evaluation of the response.

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b. The committee should be briefed by representatives of OTP and USIB on the past and/or planned efforts in these environments that address the computer security problem.

7. [] Executive Secretary of the USCSB, was present for a portion of the instant Ad Hoc Committee meeting. Concerning the action outlined in Paragraph 6a above, he commented that he could foresee no difficulty in obtaining further time from the Board; he noted that already it appeared that the meeting of 15 March would be entirely devoted to a discussion of the secure voice problem.

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8. Concerning the proposed briefing by a USIB representative, I asked [] whether he wanted me to take any action. He replied only by asking to whom he should address a request for such a USIB briefing. I told him that any formal request should be directed to the USIB Executive Secretariat (it was interesting in this dialogue that [] spoke of USIB as if it were a monolithic departmental type organization). Since the idea was not inferred by the discussion, I did not suggest that I might give such a briefing; however, I did ask for further refinement of what was wanted in the proposed briefing.

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[] outlined the following:

- a. What has USIB done in the computer security area?
- b. What is the USIB reaction to the Ad Hoc Committee's proposal?
- c. What can be done about the problem in the non-USIB environment?

9. [] scheduled another meeting of the committee for 1000 hours on Wednesday, 3 March 1971; presumably, the place is the same and I am invited. At ~~this~~ meeting he intends that OTP and USIB will brief the group.

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[]
Chairman
Computer Security Subcommittee

Atts

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4 February 1971

Comments on the Draft Recommendations Prepared by the Computer
Security Ad Hoc Committee:

See attached.

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Incl 2

Treasury Comments to COMSEC 8-WG-2

Treasury generally is in accord with the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee. However, two additional facets should be considered before USCSB Board action is taken. These concern:

- a. The latest national forums oriented towards some aspects of computers, and
- b. The responsibilities of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP).

The OTP held an interagency meeting February 25, 1970 on teleprocessing. Teleprocessing is defined as the new and emerging technology from the combinations of computers with telecommunications. This teleprocessing meeting was developed because of the desire of the General Accounting Office (GAO) for assistance in a review of the management effort being devoted to integrated computer/communications systems. This meeting was attended by 60 representatives from 32 major federal government elements. The OTP, OMB, GSA, NBS, NCS, DOD, DOT and HEW agreed to help draft a statement of general objectives in regard to teleprocessing. Later all of these agencies, except DOT, were represented by panel members on an NCS computer/communications symposium held October 27-29, 1970. Panel members also represented the Army, Navy, Air Force, NASA, FBI, VA, DCA, OST, Department of Commerce, AEC and ESSA. This symposium was attended by approximately 1,000 representatives from 57 federal government agencies. It would appear that a standing committee to include representatives from all interested departments could number from a minimum of 32 to some number in excess of 57.

The following quotes from Executive Order 11556, which assigned telecommunications functions to the OTP, tends to lend credence to the assumption that that agency has some responsibility, and should be made aware of USCSB activities, in this area:

- 2 -

"Section 2, (e) Coordinate the telecommunications activities of the Executive Branch and formulate policies and standards therefor, including but not limited to considerations of interoperability, privacy, security, spectrum use and emergency readiness."

"Section 2, (k) Conduct studies and analyses to evaluate the impact of the convergence of computer and communications technologies, and recommend needed actions to the President and to the departments and agencies."

The salient points concerned in this matter are:

- a. OTP has overall policy responsibility in the area of teleprocessing, including security aspects.
- b. OTP already has initiated discussion in the area of teleprocessing among the major Federal Government Agencies.
- c. USCSB has responsibility for objectives, policies, and procedures pertaining to the security of information during transmission.
- d. Transmission has become so enmeshed with introduction, storage and retrieval of information from computers that from a security standpoint the two functions (transmission and computer operations) should be considered together.
- e. Thus, the USCSB appears to be a logical sponsor for the development of common standards in the area of concern. However, if a decision is made to proceed, the Director, OTP should be informed so that he may be aware of USCSB action in this area, and also he may be able to provide data on requirements of Government agencies other than those represented on the USCSB.

4 February 1971

Comments on the Draft Recommendations Prepared by the Computer Security Ad Hoc Committee:

There appears to be general agreement within the Air Force that there is a need for a national policy on computer security. There is, however, a school of thought which considers that the USCSB may not be the proper national forum to sponsor the development of such policy. The latter aspect of the matter is under study and Air Force views relating thereto will be submitted prior to the next USCSB meeting on 15 March 1971.

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Incl 2

Comments from Transportation on the Computer Security Paper/26 Feb 71/dictated to Cill over the phone.

"DOT concurs with the conclusion of the Ad Hoc Committee that the USCIB is a proper national forum to address the total problems of computer security.

"We note the concerns expressed periodically by the President and the Congress with respect to all ADP management in government and also with respect to the issue of privacy. We note further the existence of other government organizational elements which could become active in the computer security areas. DOT believes, therefore, that the USCIB should be given specific authority to develop and promulgate national policies and standards for those areas of computer security presently assigned to it.

"Therefore, it is recommended that the Board's charter be amended."

Comments on the Draft Recommendations Prepared by the
Computer Security Ad Hoc Committee:

1. The National Security Agency endorses the substance of the Committee's conclusions as to the Board's jurisdiction only as it applies to COMSEC and EMSEC and particularly in those situations when the computer is functioning as an integral part of a secure Federal telecommunications system (e.g. AUTODIN). Considerable bodies of approved COMSEC and EMSEC techniques are available and should be brought to bear on communications and emanations security problems when they arise in computer operations. Aside from the above, NSA has special competence in the development and use of computers, in addition to its responsibility under the NSC COMSEC Directive to act for the Executive Agent in COMSEC matters. If the Board adopts its Committee's recommendations, we suggest that NSA be charged with developing any required COMSEC and EMSEC policies and standards for the Board.

2. NSA agrees that the Board should provide guidance in the COMSEC and EMSEC areas of computer security. NSA considers that a standing committee, if formed, should not assume responsibility for evaluating or approving specific prescriptive/restrictive control measures, supervisory routines, other protective software programs or system operating procedures developed or being considered by Departments and Agencies for use in computer systems. To do so would be to render a disservice to the organization concerned because, as a practical matter, such evaluation or approval (formal or tacit) would, in the typical case, be based on incomplete information and therefore might be invalid. Furthermore, it may be completely invalidated by subsequent hardware and software changes. This responsibility properly rests with an authority who is in direct control of the system's operation and who is in a position to maintain detailed and current knowledge of all program changes.

3. In conclusion, the National Security Agency reiterates its concern for improved computer security and expresses its willingness to commit its resources in cooperation with the Board to the development of appropriate standards in the communications and emanations security areas.

Louis W Tordella

SIGNATURE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

25/2/71
DATE

Page Denied

4 February 1971

Comments on the Draft Recommendations Prepared by the Computer
Security Ad Hoc Committee:

Federal Bureau of Investigation concurs.

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Incl 2

4 February 1971

Comments on the Draft Recommendations Prepared by the Computer Security Ad Hoc Committee:

Concur.



SIGNATURE

RADM, USN

Alternate U.S. Navy Member USCSF
TITLE

U.S. Navy

AGENCY

18 February 1971

Incl 2